Ignorância moral e virtudes na teoria de D. Coitinho: sobre casos de isenção e desculpa moral
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.vol16i37.6757Keywords:
responsibility, moral ignorance, moral excuse, moral exemption, agencyAbstract
This article examines the problem of moral responsibility based on the capacities of the moral agent in contexts of moral ignorance. Drawing on the theories of Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf, the text distinguishes between agents capable of moral self-reflection and those whose sanity and agency are compromised. Building on this theoretical framework, we analyze Denis Coitinho’s theory on the problem of moral ignorance and the virtues required of the moral agent. Coitinho argues that moral ignorance may block blame when there is epistemic justification and virtues such as autonomy and justice in action, resulting in moral excuse. We examine his position on the subject, exploring the possibility of expanding his proposal to encompass cases of moral exemption.
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