Skeptical theism and the reasonable epistemic access condition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26694/pensando.vol16i37.6707Keywords:
Theism, Skepticism, evil, epistemic access, reasonableAbstract
Theism is the doctrine that affirms the existence of a transcendent creator with a series of essential attributes, among which are omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. A serious problem for this doctrine is the existence of gratuitous evil in the world; for how could God allow the existence of gratuitous pain and suffering if he has such great properties? Below, we present a version of this problem, known as the epistemic problem of evil, and we introduce the skeptical theist's response, based on the epistemic principle known as the “Reasonable Epistemic Access Condition” (REAC). In the following section, we discuss the counterfactual objection that the REAC principle on which skeptical theism is based is overly restrictive and we question the response offered by Wykstra and Perrine (2012). Finally, in the last section, we offer a defense of skeptical theism and a reformulation of CORNEA that avoids the counterfactual objection.
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